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Abstract
This article explores the place of individuals, ideologies and personal and political 
networks in shaping the larger political landscape in revolutionary Russia. The shape 
and culture of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (psr) will be at the heart of my anal-
ysis of coalition politics. I focus particularly on the personal and political networks 
surrounding Vladimir Mikhailovich Zenzinov during 1917. This analysis suggests that 
the shape of coalition politics in 1917 was defined in part by pre-revolutionary social 
and political networks, and that these to some extent transcended party political 
affiliations. While the nature of coalition politics necessitated this political fluidity, it 
is nevertheless worth emphasizing, because the discourse around 1917 is often framed 
along explicitly party political lines.
Keywords
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Semion Lyandres’s recent collection of interviews demonstrates the impor-
tance of personal relationships and networks in defining political participation 
* I would like to thank all participants of the conference ‘Russia’s Failed Democratic Revolu-
tion, February–October 1917: A Centenary Reappraisal’ (Chicago, August 2015, Rome, March 
2016), and particularly Semion Lyandres, who was the intellectual instigator and practical 
facilitator of this wonderful forum. Special thanks also to Sally Boniece and Hannu Immonen 
for generously sharing their knowledge, and to Jonathan Kwan for patiently reading and re-
conceptualising this article with me.
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during 1917.2 This article will explore the personal and political networks of the 
Socialist Revolutionary Party (psr) member Vladimir Zenzinov during 1917. 
The historical discourse that has developed around high politics in 1917 has em-
phasized ideological divisions and party political considerations. By emphasiz-
ing individual backgrounds and networks within the psr, this study offers us an 
alternative framework through which to interrogate the politics of 1917.3 This 
article contributes to our understanding of the revolution in three ways. First, 
exploring the milieu of the psr’s political elite enables a glimpse into relation-
ships between personal, institutional and political networks. Second, political 
actors without a strong public face are under-reported in the revolutionary 
narratives, but they could play vital roles in decision-making. This exploration 
of personal networks hints at the possible roles of the revolution’s ‘back room 
men’. Finally, this study complicates and blurs the party political and ideologi-
cal lines drawn between the different strands of Russia’s revolutionary political 
elite in 1917.
Vladimir Zenzinov was a lynchpin member of the psr. He stood in the 
centre-right of the party, served on the party’s Central Committee, and was an 
active member of its terrorist wing. He was famously exiled to remote Yakutsk 
province for his revolutionary activities, from whence he repeatedly escaped.4 
In 1917, he took on multiple roles within the party’s upper strata in Petrograd, 
acting as a party organizer and chief whip, editing the party’s newspaper Delo 
naroda, as well as serving on the Executive Committee of the Petrograd So-
viet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. He was close friends with Aleksandr 
Kerenskii, and acted as an interlocutor in the fractious relations between 
Kerenskii and the psr’s Central Committee. He was the epitome of the back 
room man—he was no orator or public figure, but his actions and ideas shaped 
the psr’s responses to the revolutionary year.
The psr was Russia’s largest and most popular political party in 1917. 
Its programme was founded on socialisation of land, expropriation of land 
without compensation, and a federal republic state. Viktor Mikhailovich 
Chernov, the party’s leading theorist, argued that the positive aspects of capi-
talism, manifested primarily in large-scale production and the co-operative 
2 Semion Lyandres, The fall of Tsarism: Untold stories of the February 1917 Revolution (Oxford, 
2013).
3 James Joll’s study of the First World War appealed to historians to look to the common edu-
cational backgrounds of the British political elites in shaping their responses to war. (James 
Joll, “1914: The unspoken assumptions.,” in The origins of the First World War, ed. H. W. Koch 
(Basingstoke, 1972), 313–16.)
4 He wrote a florid but magnificent memoir of his final Siberian exile; Vladimir Zenzinov, The 
road to oblivion (New York, 1931).
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movement, could be realized in Russia without the unmitigated development 
of capitalism. Chernov aimed to protect peasant interests through the non-
capitalist development of agriculture.5 In the psr vision, the peasantry did 
not have to become an industrial proletariat for socialism to triumph. The psr 
expressed itself as an organic part of social democrat-oriented international 
socialism. 6 Chernov’s attempts to assimilate nascent sr theories with western 
European socialism waned after 1902, however, when western European so-
cialism came to be associated with reformism, while Chernov preferred to be 
positioned firmly on the side of ‘revolutionaries’.7
The psr’s programme offered a ‘third way’ for Russia in 1917, uniting toilers 
and intelligentsia to avoid the spectre of out-and-out class war, and instead of-
fering Russia the opportunity to develop its own brand of socialism. Although 
it adopted Marxist class models, it regarded class as secondary to education 
and understanding in forming social groups. Working peasants were includ-
ed in the category of toilers, and their unity of interests with the industrial 
proletariat was stressed repeatedly in party literature, particularly in 1917.8 
Rather than playing on the imagery of class war, Chernov preferred to regard 
the destruction of private property as benefiting exploiters, as well as toilers. 
Toilers would be freed of ‘excessive work and semi-starvation’, while the ex-
ploiters would be relieved of ‘the degeneration of mankind from uselessness 
and superfluity’.9
The psr was unable to bring its third way politics to the fore in 1917, and 
has consequently been marginalized in studies of the revolutionary period. 
5 Chernov outlined his theoretical stance on the agrarian question in a series of articles pub-
lished in Russkoe bogatstvo in 1900. Chernov, ‘Tipy kapitalistecheskoi i agrarnoi evoliutsii’, 
Russkoe bogatstvo no. 5 (1900): 48.
6 Chernov, ‘Tipy kapitalistecheskoi i agrarnoi evoliutsii’, Russkoe bogatstvo no. 10 (1900): 251–56; 
Chernov, ‘K voprosu o kapatilisticheskoi i agrarnoi evoliutsii’ Russkoe bogatstvo no. 11 (1900): 
259.
7 See Hannu Immonen, The Agraran Program of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party, 1900–
1914 (Helsinki, 1988): 74; V. Chernov, ‘Sotsializatsiia zemli i kooperatsia v sel’skom khoziaistve’, 
Revoliustionnaia Rossiia 14 (1902).
8 For an elucidation of this, see L. Shishko, Po programmnym voprosam (Moscow, 1906), 39. 
Shishko was among the leading theorists of the psr, participating in the working out of its 
programme, and a member of the psr committee abroad. See also Christopher Rice, Russian 
workers and the Socialist Revolutionary Party throught the revolution of 1905–7 (Basingstoke, 
1988).
9 The quotations are drawn from the psr party programme. (Politicheskie partii Rossii, konets 
19- pervaia tret’ 20 veka. Entsiklopediia, ed. V. V. Shelokhaev (Moscow, 1996), 139–46.) The su-
perfluous man was a theme of late nineteenth-century literature, perhaps most famously in 
M. Lermontov, A Hero of Our Time (Harmondsworth, 1966).
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Michael Melancon has been the party’s key chronicler and champion over re-
cent decades in western scholarship, while Mikhail Ivanovich Leonov and Kon-
stantin Nikolaevich Morozov have led scholarship on the psr from within the 
Russian Federation. 10 Scholarship on the party is still relatively small, and has 
tended to focus on its terrorist and agrarian elements, though its leading fig-
ures, Aleksandr Fedorovich Kerenskii and Viktor Chernov, have recently been 
the subject of scholarly biographies.11 Oliver Radkey’s 1958 work stands as the 
only work focusing exclusively on the psr in 1917. Hannu Immonen’s recent 
biography of Chernov has demonstrated that Radkey’s treatment of the srs is 
misleading in its treatment both of Chernov and more broadly of sr policies.12 
Radkey’s work has been treated here as a primary source in its own right, as it 
forms a repository for oral testimonies collected by Radkey himself from the 
10 Michael Melancon, “‘Marching together!’ Left bloc activities in the Russian revolutionary 
movement, 1900– February 1917,” Slavic Review no. 2 (1990): 239–52; “Soldiers, peasant- 
soldiers, and peasant-workers and their organisations in Petrograd: Ground level revolu-
tion during the early months of 1917,” Soviet and Post Soviet Review no. 3 (1996): 161–90; 
“The sr Party, 1917–1920,” in Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution, ed. Edward Ac-
ton, V. U. Cherniaev, and William G. Rosenberg, The sr Party, 1917–1920 (London, 1997), 
281–90; M. I. Leonov, psr v 1907–1914 gg. (Moscow, 1997); K. N. Morozov, Partiia sotsialistov-
revoliutsionerov v 1907–1914gg. (Moscow, 1998).
11 Hannu Immonen, Mechty o novoi Rossii : Viktor Chernov (1873–1952) (St. Petersburg, 2015); 
Vladimir Fediuk, Kerenskii (Moscow, 2009). Manfred Hildermeier dominated the German 
scholarship on the Socialist Revolutionary Party. His major work published in 1978 was 
published in an English translation in 2000. M. Hildermeier, Die Sozialrevolutonare partei 
Russlands: Agrarosozialismus und Moderisierung in Zarenreich (1900–1914) (Koln, 1978); 
Manfred Hildermeier, The Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party before the First World War 
(Münster, 2000). Studies on the agrarian programme of the psr include Maureen Per-
rie, The agrarian policy of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. From its origins through the 
revolution of 1905–7 (Cambridge, 1976); Hannu Immonen, The agrarian programme of the 
Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party, 1900–1914. Notable works on the Left Socialist Revo-
lutionaries include Lutz Haefner, “Die Partei der Linken Sozialrevoliutionare in der rus-
sischen Revolution von 1917–18” (Doctoral thesis, Koln, 1994), Ronald Kowalski, “‘Fellow 
Travellers’ or revolutionary dreamers? The left srs after 1917,” Revolutionary Russia, no. 
2 (1998), pp. 1–31, Scott B. Smith, Captives of revolution: the socialist revolutionaries and 
the Bolshevik dictatorship, 1918–1923 (Pittsburgh, Pa, 2011). Other significant works include 
B. V. Levanov, “Programmnye printsipy partii sotsialistov-revoliutsionerov,” Voprosy Istorii 
kpss, no. 6 (1991), pp. 100–09; Lev G. Protasov, “K istorii bor’bi eserov za armiiu v 1917g,” in 
Neproletarskii partii Rossii v trekh revoliutsiiakh. Sbornik statei, ed. K. V. Gusev (Moscow, 
1989); Nurit Schliefman, Undercover Agents in the Russian Revolutionary Movement. The sr 
Party 1902–1914 (London, 1988).
12 Immonen, Mechty o novoi Rossii, see conclusion for analysis of Radkey.
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party’s luminaries in exile. The person at the heart of this interrogation, Vladi-
mir Mikhailovich Zenzinov, was one of Radkey’s most trusted sources.13
 Vladimir Zenzinov and his milieu
Vladimir Zenzinov was born into an extremely wealthy merchant family. His 
father was a Moscow merchant, and both his parents came originally from 
Nerchinsk; his mother was reportedly descended from one of the strel’tsy fami-
lies. Zenzinov’s father had developed his trade network through Siberia, and 
the family retained their links with the region, which was to help Zenzinov 
when he was later exiled to Siberia. Zenzinov described his family life as stable 
and loving, with his own adventures the chief source of familial stress and anx-
iety. He commented that ‘no-one at home was interested in social problems or 
cared for politics.’14 He was an able student, and the only one of four siblings 
to attend the gymnasium, where he flourished academically, and developed an 
enthusiasm for radical politics, unlike his ‘rather dissipated’ brothers. Zenzinov 
spent his adolescent weekends composing pamphlets, which he scattered ran-
domly around Moscow’s working-class districts. The pamphlets were inspired 
and shaped by his study of the French revolution. These youthful activities 
drew the attention of police agents—his first summons to the secret police 
offices came when he was seventeen years old. The young Zenzinov headed to 
Europe to attend university, starting in Brussels in 1899, before moving on to 
study in Berlin and Heidelberg. Zenzinov developed lifelong friendships dur-
ing his university years, and cemented his commitment to the revolutionary 
cause. The thriving Russian student community in Berlin provided Zenzinov 
with a forum to meet like-minded Russian youths. Despite sentimental attach-
ment to Russia, Zenzinov and his ilk felt most at home in Western Europe. 
When he crossed the border into Western Europe for the first time in 1899, he 
recalled that:
My new impressions were truly enchanting. As soon as I crossed the Rus-
sian frontier, with its customs officials and hateful gendarmes, the new 
world opened before me. Instead of scattered villages of thatched roofs 
13 Oliver H. Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism. Promise and Default of the Russian So-
cialist Revolutionaries, February to October 1917 (New York, 1958).
14 Bakhmeteff Archive, Butler Library, Rare Book and Manuscript section, Columbia Univer-
sity; ‘Vladimir Mikhailovich Zenzinov papers, 1900–1953’ (henceforth Zenzinov papers), 
box 12, ‘Our family’, p. 21.
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and ragged, bare-foot children, where everything spoke of a wretched, 
primitive life, I saw densely populated towns, clean houses, iron roofs, 
well-dressed men and women. Everything seemed different.15
His hostility towards rural Russian poverty and culture, and the unspoken ap-
proval of German ‘superiority’ in hygiene, town planning, education, agricul-
ture, and so on, spoke volumes about his attitude towards Russia, and Russia’s 
rural people. This more broadly reflected the values of late Imperial educated 
society. Germans were held up as models of zealous ‘un-Russian’ cleanliness 
and efficiency. Russia’s nineteenth-century literature is replete with these cli-
chés, as with Goncharov’s depiction of Oblomov’s strict and businesslike Ger-
man steward, the references to Germans in Turgenev’s Fathers and Sons, and 
Tolstoy’s representation of Nekhliudov’s German steward in his last and great 
novel Resurrection.16
Zenzinov moved in circles of highly educated, intelligent young Russians, 
who were from extremely privileged backgrounds. The interconnectedness of 
Socialist Revolutionary activists had an incestuous feel, with close concentric 
circles of association. Zenzinov developed deep and enduring friendships with 
15 V. Zenzinov, Perezhitoe (New York, 1953), 66.
16 Ivan Sergeevich Turgenev, Fathers and Sons, ed. Rosemary Edmonds (Harmondsworth, 
1965), 111; Ivan Aleksandrovich Goncharov, Oblomov (London, 1954); Leo Tolstoy, Resurrec-
tion (Oxford, 1899), book 2, chapter 1.
 AQ1
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Abram Rafailovich Gots, Ilia Isidorovich Fondaminskii and Nikolai Dmitriev-
ich Avksent’ev, all of whom were central figures in the psr and in party activity 
during 1917. Zenzinov was in love with Amaliia Osipovna Gavronsky. Amalia 
was a Moscow merchant’s daughter. Her brother, Dmitrii Osipovich Gavronsky, 
was a prominent figure in the psr. Dmitrii Osipovich studied in German uni-
versities between 1899 and 1904, and was a Doctor of Philosophy. He joined the 
psr in 1904, and was exiled administratively overseas in 1907. He returned to 
Russia in 1910, but was forced to emigrate again. He returned to Russia through 
Germany in 1917, became a member of the Moscow Soviet, and was elected to 
the Constituent Assembly on the psr list for Simbirsk.17
Amaliia, like her brother, was entangled with the psr’s upper echelons. 
When Zenzinov confessed his feelings to Amaliia, she explained that she 
was secretly engaged to Ilia Fondaminskii. The young Zenzinov suffered great 
emotional torment as a result, but declared that his love for Amaliia ultimately 
brought him closer to his dear friend Fondaminskii. Zenzinov’s love for Amali-
ia seemed to endure through his life—his personal photographs are replete 
with images of the beautiful Amaliia, and he never married.18 Zenzinov’s pri-
vate photographs of the friends together reveal the wealth and privilege that 
surrounded this group. They lived well wherever they went, and looked every 
inch the wealthy merchants’ sons and daughters they were, hiking in the Alps, 
riding good horses in full equipment, taking the air in various spas. All of his 
intimates came from extremely wealthy and privileged backgrounds, and their 
life in Europe reflected the pastimes and preoccupations of the extremely 
wealthy.19 The Gots family was one of the wealthiest in the Russian Empire, the 
Fondaminskii family was not far behind, and Zenzinov’s father had a fortune 
of more than a million rubles.20
Avksent’ev, Gots and Fondaminskii were Zenzinov’s closest friends and his 
political allies. The four men had much in common, in terms of their back-
grounds, their education, and their carceral experiences. Avksent’ev was a 
nobleman, and studied in Berlin, where he joined the émigré revolutionary 
movement. Both Gots and Fondaminskii were merchants’ sons, like Zenzinov. 
17 Gavronsky emigrated in 1918, and became a professor of Philosophy at Berlin University. 
(L. G. Protasov, Liudi Uchreditel’nogo sobraniia: portret v inter’ere epokhi (Moscow, 2008), 
277.)
18 Amaliia died in 1935 from tuberculosis, in Switzerland. Zenzinov contributed to a volume 
published in her memory in Paris in 1937. Z. N. Gippius, V. V. Nabokov, and V. Zenzinov, 
Pamiati Amalii Osipovny Fondaminskoi (Parizh, 1937).
19 Zenzinov papers, boxes 3, 27, 29, 30.
20 Hildermeier, The Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party before the First World War, 254.
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They were also both Jewish, and Zenzinov commented that they were his first 
close association with Jews, whom he described as ‘just like him, as members 
of the Russian intelligentsia’, but with distinct and arcane family backgrounds 
and traditions. Gots and Fondaminskii both had elder brothers who were in-
volved in the Populist revolutionary movement and exiled to Siberia. Matvei 
Fondaminskii died of tuberculosis in Siberia at the age of 29. Mikhail Gots was 
exiled to eastern Siberia in 1886, but was amnestied in 1895, and was a lead-
ing light of the émigré revolutionary movement in Paris and Geneva until his 
death in 1906. Both men’s younger brothers became intimately involved in the 
revolutionary movement, and Gots junior had smuggled manuscripts out of 
Russia when he was only 17 years old.
Like almost all revolutionary activists, the four men shared experiences of 
arrest, incarceration and exile. The carceral lives of wealthy, well-connected 
men like Zenzinov and Avksent’ev reflected the particularities of their milieu. 
Their daily lives in exile were cushioned by their wealth and privilege, and es-
cape from exile was facilitated by money. While very many exiles of all social 
backgrounds escaped between 1905 and 1917, those who went abroad were dis-
proportionately from wealthy backgrounds.21 All four men spent many years 
of their pre-revolutionary lives in Western Europe. Fondaminskii escaped from 
21 See Sarah Badcock, A Prison Without Walls? Eastern Siberian Exile in the Last Years of Tsar-
ism (Oxford, 2016).
 AQ1
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Russia in 1906 after being arrested, and stayed in Europe till the 1917 revolu-
tion. Avksent’ev escaped from exile in 1907, and based himself in Paris until 
the revolution. Abraham Gots was arrested and sentenced to seven years hard 
labour in 1907, followed by exile in Irkutsk province. He returned to Petrograd 
in April 1917, as did Fondaminskii and Avksent’ev.
The vast majority of the revolutionary movement’s leaders shared this his-
tory of prison, exile and emigration. Indeed, when we look to the biographies 
of revolutionaries across the political spectrum, the degree of commonality in 
their backgrounds and experiences is startling. Zenzinov’s social background 
was typical of the psr elites, which were dominated by wealthy, young, male 
intellectuals. Over its existence from 1902 till 1925, the psr’s Central Committee 
had 74 members.22 Only nine per cent of them (seven) were of working-class 
(peasant or worker) background, while nearly thirty percent (23) were from 
the nobility. All but three of the 74 had middle or higher education.23 Although 
the psr had a number of very prominent female members, its leadership was 
absolutely dominated by men. Only eight percent (six) of the Central Com-
mittee were women. The Central Committee of the Left srs largely shared this 
background as well, though the proportion of Left srs who had spent much 
time abroad was substantially lower. The Left srs were also in a different de-
mographic group—they tended to be younger than the centre and right srs.24 
Most of the sr leadership represented themselves very self-consciously as part 
of Russia’s intelligentsia.25 They cultivated and supported one another, and 
perpetuated very particular ideas about revolution and ordinary people. They 
almost without exception lacked any direct experience of lower-class life in 
Russia, and their notions of revolution were shaped in abstract ideas, and in 
the model of the French revolution.
While Zenzinov and his circle came to be advocates of moderate coali-
tion politics in 1917, this proclivity to coalition was not defined by their back-
grounds and experiences. Many of those to the left, who were hostile to the 
Provisional Government and who promulgated radical alternatives to 1917, 
shared their trajectories. Mark Andreevich Natanson, for example, a founder 
22 1925 was the end of the party’s activities in the Soviet Union. The party’s Central Commit-
tee endured abroad until 1939.
23 Data compiled from Politicheskii partii Rossii, konets 19- pervaia tret’ 20 veka. Entsiklope-
diia; Leonov, psr v 1907–1914 gg.
24 Ia. A. Leon’tev, “Personal’nyi sostav Ts.K. partii levykh eserov (problemy rekonstruktsii),” 
Otechestvennaya istoriia no. 2 (2007): 121–39.
25 See Christopher Read, Culture and Power in Revolutionary Russia: the Intelligentsia and the 
Transition from Tsarism to Communism (New York, 1990), 14, 37.
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member of the psr and always a leading light of its left faction, was born of a 
merchant family. He fled Russia in 1904 after multiple escapes, imprisonments 
and exiles, and lived in Munich and Lausanne. Boris Davidovich Kamkov, an-
other leader of the Left srs in 1917, had modest intelligentsia parentage. He 
fled abroad in 1907, and lived in Germany, France and Italy. He completed his 
law degree at Heidelberg in 1911. Isaac Nakhmanovich Shteinberg became one 
of the Left srs’ leading figures, and served briefly as Minister of Justice in the 
lsr-Bolshevik coalition government. Shteinberg was from a Jewish merchant 
family. He was a polyglot, and studied law at the universities of Moscow and 
Heidelberg. He joined the psr in 1906, and was arrested and exiled in 1907. He 
fled abroad, then returned to Russia in 1910, and worked in law and publishing 
till he was again arrested and exiled in 1915. These men shared an affiliation 
with the psr, and inhabited the same worlds socially, culturally and geographi-
cally. In 1917, however, they were to adopt extremely divergent positions, but in 
the pre-revolutionary period the revolutionary cliques abroad were difficult to 
disentangle—they inhabited concentric circles, joined by place, by marriage, 
by friendship, and by association.
Chernov’s biography is a useful illustration of these intersections between 
personal and political relationships within the party. Chernov, who was to be-
come the titular leader of the psr, was a little older than Zenzinov, and was not 
one of his close friends. Born into a family of civil servants in Samara province, 
Chernov joined the law faculty at Moscow University in 1892. He was first ar-
rested in April 1894 and was imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress for six 
months, then sent into exile. Chernov went into emigration in 1899, where he 
remained until April 1917, apart from a brief return to Russia in 1905.26 Chernov 
married Anastasiia Nikolaevna Sletova, a civil servant’s daughter from Tambov, 
in 1899. Sletova was an important figure in the party in her own right; she was a 
founder member of the psr, and was elected to the Constituent Assembly for 
Tambov. Her brother, Stepan Nikolaevich Sletov, was a significant figure in the 
psr. Also a founder member, Sletov moved in and out of Russian underground 
work, prison and exile, and emigration, and was a key figure in the develop-
ment of the party’s terrorist wing. The psr elites were connected by social 
background, by carceral experience, by friendship, and by marriage.
Zenzinov’s connections with the psr emerged directly from his personal 
friendship networks. At university, Zenzinov and his friends had run errands 
for the new party, collecting funds for publications from among the Russian 
student body, circulating copies of ‘Revolutionary Russia’, and recruiting new 
sympathizers. Mikhail Gots and Osip Solomonovich Minor came to Halle in 
26 For more detail, see Immonen, Mechty o novoi Rossii, chapters 1–4.
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1903 to ask Zenzinov, Avksent’ev and Abram Gots to join active party work, but 
they refused because they wanted to complete their studies, as they believed 
that their higher education would help them to ‘serve the cause’. Zenzinov 
changed his mind, and set aside his Ph.D. studies to return to Russia and enter 
full-time revolutionary work in December 1903. This change of heart was not 
a result of his revolutionary fervor. It came about because of his doomed love 
for Amalia—immersion in party work gave him a chance to distance himself 
physically and emotionally from his love triangle. He was summoned to Nice 
to meet Mikhail Gots, who gave him his mission: to form a party committee in 
Moscow, and to hand a book to Evno Fishelevich Azef.27 This mission initiated 
Zenzinov into the party’s inner circles, where he was to stay until the end of 
the psr’s existence.
Vladimir Zenzinov had a romantic attachment to the psr movement, but 
there is little indication in his memoirs that he held a strong ideological af-
finity with Populism. Rather, his social circles defined his political affiliations. 
There are no indications anywhere in Zenzinov’s writings that he had any di-
rect connections with lower-class Russians, or any practical experience of life 
outside his privileged world. In a revealing anecdote, Zenzinov recalls a meet-
ing in 1906 with his friend Gots, who had disguised himself as a cabby and had 
gone underground as part of a terrorist plot to kill Ivan Nikolaevich Durnovo, 
then Minister of the Interior. Zenzinov was astonished by his friend’s life expe-
riences as a working man, and recalled that “Abram told me many interesting 
things about the life of the poor in St Petersburg.”28 Russia’s lower classes were 
almost entirely outside Zenzinov’s knowledge and experience. After the Octo-
ber revolution, Zenzinov expressed the belief that ‘the masses’ did support Bol-
shevism, but that they would ‘sober up’ when peace and land were shown to 
be illusory.29 His attitude towards the psr’s constituency was derisory. He had 
no notion of the party’s popular support, or what their support base might be 
based on. This lack of connection with the party’s popular base was a feature 
of coalition policies as they developed in 1917. The moderates stressed the need 
to contain and manage popular political attitudes and actions, and to educate 
ordinary Russians so that they would support the ‘correct’ political position.30 
The political left, on the other hand, though not necessarily more intimately 
27 See Zenzinov papers, box 12. Also Zenzinov, Perezhitoe, 110.
28 Zenzinov papers, box 13, p. 79; see also Perezhitoe, 303.
29 ‘Upoenie pobedami’, Delo naroda no. 198, November 3, 1917.
30 For a discussion of this trend within Provisional Government policy more broadly, see 
Sarah Badcock, “Talking to the People and Shaping Revolution: The Drive for Enlighten-
ment in Revolutionary Russia,” Russian Review 4 (65) (2006): 617–36.
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connected with ordinary Russians, tended to support grassroots political activ-
ism, and retained an enthusiasm for popular action.
 The psr in 1917
psr members were the infamous losers of the revolution in 1917. They appar-
ently wielded popular support but failed to translate it into political power. Of 
the party’s leading figures, only Kerenskii, whose affiliation with the psr was in 
fact tenuous at best, and Chernov, the party’s leading theorist and Minister of 
Agriculture for three months in 1917, are names that might spark popular rec-
ognition. The party’s other luminaries are mostly anonymous in the historical 
narrative, condemned to grey absence by the failure of their party to command 
political power relative to their apparent support. The historian Oliver Radkey 
noted that while Chernov and Kerenskii were outstanding personalities de-
spite their faults, the party’s other leading figures ‘seem to have been men of 
rather average ability’.31 These average men were revolutionary generals in 1917. 
They led the revolution’s key institutions, and their political decisions were 
instrumental in shaping the ultimate defeat of moderate socialism. Zenzinov 
had returned to Moscow in 1915 after having completed his sentence of exile. 
He arrived in Petrograd in January 1917, and lived there, in the heart of revolu-
tionary politics, until January 1918.
Zenzinov was a back room man, a journalist and party organizer, not an 
orator or a politician. This means that he was largely occluded from public 
view in 1917. The only hint that he might ever have taken a more public role 
was Radkey’s suggestion that Zenzinov was considered, but overlooked, for a 
ministerial post in late summer.32 He was the leading figure in the psr’s centre-
right faction, and this faction dominated official psr policy in 1917. Zenzinov 
belonged to an exclusive milieu, which largely shared their social background, 
education, travel, and attitudes towards ordinary people and to revolutionary 
struggle. Zenzinov’s personal networks within the elite political milieu over-
lapped with political ideologies in shaping his responses to 1917.
The psr’s distinctive vision of united class interests among peasants, 
workers and intelligentsia dominated psr propaganda in 1917, and defined 
their narrative of the 1917 revolution. Zenzinov maintained a robust commit-
ment to this position, and was a staunch defender of the party’s centre-right 
position. While third-way politics should have been relevant to the discours-
31 Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, 461.
32 Ibid., 316.
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es that developed in 1917, the psr failed to make a substantial impact on the 
shape of revolutionary discourse, which largely speaking eschewed third-way 
politics and instead emphasized class struggle and irreconcilable polarization 
and alienation of different political positions.33 The Left sr faction empha-
sized the prioritization of more immediate lower-class gains from the outset, 
over ‘bourgeois’ and ‘reactionary’ political coalition with moderates, and this 
drew them towards a relationship with the Bolsheviks.
The roles adopted by Zenzinov and his closest associates in 1917 testified to 
their power and influence in the revolutionary year. When the February revo-
lution engulfed Petrograd, Zenzinov played a leading role in the formation of 
the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ deputies, though 
he was not very active within it.34 He energetically pursued the unmasking of 
former police agents, and oversaw the decommissioning of the tsarist police.35 
He was a party organizer and shaper. Zenzinov’s closest friends also played 
leading roles. All were members of the psr’s central committee. Avksent’ev 
was a member of the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet and chair-
man of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants’ Deputies. He was Minister of Inter-
nal Affairs in the Provisional Government from the 24 July until the beginning 
of September, and in October he served as chairman of the Pre-Parliament. 
Abram Gots was the leader of the sr faction in the Petrograd soviet. He was 
chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which was elected 
by the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Depu-
ties in June 1917. Fondaminskii was deputy president of the Soviet of Peasants’ 
Deputies, and Provisional Government’s commissar for the Black Sea Fleet.
Zenzinov stood firmly in the centre-right ground of the psr. This position 
gained nominal authority over the rest of the party in 1917, and policy state-
ments issued in the name of the psr during 1917 came from Zenzinov’s group. 
Their commitment to the coalition, and to the war effort, meant that they 
turned to moderation on the land question, repeating Provisional Government 
policy that the peasants must wait until the convocation of the Constituent 
33 See Smith, Captives of Revolution: the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bolshevik Dictator-
ship, 1918–1923, xiv–xv.
34 Zenzinov’s account of the February Revolution has been well used by historians: V. 
Zenzinov, “Fevral’skie dni,” Novyi zhurnal no. 34–35 (1953): 208–40.
35 Zenzinov does not refer to these activities in his memoirs. Sukhanov mentions Zenzinov’s 
role in identifying former spies; N. N. Sukhanov and Joel Carmichael, The Russian Revo-
lution, 1917: A Personal Record (Princeton, N. J.; Guildford, 1984), 196–97. For other treat-
ments of the dismantling of the police system, see Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, “Crime, police and 
mob justice in Petrograd during the Russian revolutions of 1917,” in Revolutionary Russia: 
New Approaches, ed. Rex A. Wade, Crime, police and mob justice (New York, 2004), 46–72.
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Assembly for the reallocation of land. The psr’s high levels of popular support 
was closely associated with its slogan “Zemlia i volia” (Land and Freedom), a 
pithy cry that encapsulated a general drive to seize privately held land (let the 
land belong to those who work it), and an inchoate notion of freedom from 
obligation and constraint. This slogan was an attractive sentiment, but its ap-
plication in 1917 was to prove deeply challenging, not least because there was 
no clear explanation either of how land could be transferred to peasant com-
munities, or what freedom was to mean. The interpretation of this slogan and 
agreeing on a timetable for its implementation, were questions at the heart of 
many of the divisions that emerged in the psr during 1917, at national, region-
al, and local levels. The All Russian Soviet of Peasants’ Deputies was dominated 
by right-centrist elements, and it echoed Provisional Government policy on 
the land question—they sought to postpone land reform until the Constituent 
Assembly was convened, and saw the government’s role as ‘purely protective’.36 
This cautious approach was not mirrored by the actions of peasants in regions 
across Russia, who transgressed the norms of private land-ownership through-
out 1917.37
There were profound and multiple disagreements within the party struc-
tures at every level. This disunity was a central part of what it was to be a mem-
ber of the psr. As early as 1901, Chernov spelt out the heterogeneity that the 
psr embraced:
Every vital developing social movement which comprehends reality 
according to local conditions of strength cannot expand without certain 
programmatic and tactical disagreements. Moreover, these disagree-
ments may rightly be called the moving force to develop a party pro-
gramme. A party must be able to guarantee to its members in each given 
moment freedom of opinion, full freedom of speech in defining their tac-
tics [while] uniting with this full discipline to act in the completion of 
those tasks accepted by majority decision. The party must be organised 
democratically.38
Chernov’s enthusiasm for democracy and disagreement within the par-
ty placed him in stark contrast with the party philosophy developed by his 
36 Vladimir Zenzinov, “Podzhigateli,” Delo naroda no. 125, August 12, 1917.
37 See for example Sarah Badcock, Politics and the people in revolutionary Russia: A Provincial 
History (Cambridge, 2007), ch. 7.
38 Viktor Chernov [under pseudonym O.], ‘Bibliografiia’, Nakanune. Sotsial’no-revoliutsionnoe 
obozrenie. Ezhemesiachnyi zhurnal 3(28) (1901): 343–44.
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counterpart in the Bolshevik party, Lenin.39 There was a programmatic com-
mitment to the profound discord and disunity that was to tear the party apart 
in 1917. Dissent within the party was so widespread that it was the norm, rather 
than the exception; almost no single element of party programme was unani-
mously supported. In the elections to the Central Committee in 1907, candi-
dates were selected from separate lists representing the left, the centre and the 
right of the party.40 These categories operated only as indicators of broader 
trends within the party. Zenzinov fought throughout 1917 to retain the unity 
of the party, in the face of increasingly obvious splits. This is evident in his ac-
tivities on the party’s Central Committee.41 The party’s splits formalized in the 
summer of 1917. By the time of the Democratic Conference (14–22 September), 
Zenzinov authorized ‘freedom of action’ for all three currents within the party, 
as in fact the different factions had almost nothing in common with one an-
other. By the beginning of October, Zenzinov was forced to admit that the psr 
as single entity no longer existed.42
These divisions within the party were entirely to be expected. The range of 
political opinion among self-professed srs was bewildering, from the staunch 
defencists and moderates on the right like Mark Veniaminovich Vishniak and 
Ekaterina Konstantinovna Breshko-Breshkovskaia, to the extreme left headed 
by Natanson and Maria Aleksandrovna Spiridonova. Zenzinov retained a ro-
mantic conception of the psr as a united movement, in the face of growing ev-
idence that challenged his position. Zenzinov was appalled by the distinctions 
different groups drew for themselves. He recalled that at the fiercely factional 
psr Party Congress at the end of May, he tore down the labels that the different 
factions had pasted on their meeting room doors, and declared that there was 
only one type of sr.43 In fact, the evidence from the practice of politics in 1917 
indicates that the psr was an umbrella organisation that encapsulated a broad 
range of individuals, who shared a putative commitment to social and political 
revolution in a neo-Populist framework, but whose allegiances shattered when 
faced with the pressure of governance in 1917.
39 See Robert Service, Lenin: A Biography (Basingstoke, 2000), 138–46, on the genesis of 
‘What Is To Be done?’, Lenin’s thesis on the necessary organization of the revolution-
ary party. See also Lars T. Lih and Vladimir Il’ich Lenin, Lenin rediscovered: What Is To Be 
Done? in Context (Boston, 2006).
40 Haefner, “Die Partei der Linken Sozialrevoliutionare,” 65–66. G. Anoprieva and N. Erofeev 
discuss three trends of thought within the party, with significant differences of opinion in 
each (Politicheskie partii Rossii, konets 19- pervaia tret’ 20 veka. Entsiklopediia, 440).
41 See Zenzinov papers, box 43, ‘Minutes of the psr Central Committee, 1917–1918’.
42 Partiinye izvestiia no. 2, October 5, 1917.
43 Interview with Zenzinov in Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, 195.
0002786730.INDD   148 6/29/2016   4:14:38 PM
 149Personal and political networks in 1917
journal of modern russian history and historiography 9 (2016) 134-158
300854
Zenzinov’s central sr group and the Menshevik leadership formed a coher-
ent and effective bloc for much of 1917. How was it that in 1917, when political 
ideologies were apparently so prominent, these politicians with such appar-
ently diverse ideological backgrounds shared so much common ground? In 
fact, many of the power networks that we see in 1917 cut across party lines—a 
centre sr had more in common with a Menshevik than with a Left sr, and Left 
srs travelled with the Bolsheviks rather than with the right of their own party. 
In the coalition, personal networks counted for more than party political af-
filiations in 1917. Both Avksent’ev and Gots were close friends with Menshevik 
leaders. They had shared experiences and world perspectives, personally, in 
émigré politics and in exile. Gots and Tsereteli had both been in exile in east-
ern Siberia before the revolution, and they travelled back to European Russia 
together. The world of Siberian exile was an important space for the forging 
of strong relationships and solidarities. There was strong support for a united 
front of socialists among some Siberian exiles.44 Fedor Il’ich Dan and Vasilii 
Gavrilovich Archangel’skii actually called for the unification of Mensheviks 
and srs before they left Irkutsk for the capital in March 1917.45 While the divi-
sions and distinctions between sd and sr ideologies have always been empha-
sized, 1917 demonstrates emphatically that the moderates and extremists of 
both groups crossed party political divides.
A good example of these cross-party, back room power networks is in the 
leadership of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. The first 
all-Russian Soviet conference cemented an alliance between the psr and Men-
sheviks at the end of March, and there was very little conflict between Men-
sheviks and srs until the alliance finally foundered at the end of September. 
While the psr remained in coalition with the Mensheviks, as they did for most 
of 1917, they retained joint control of both Moscow and Petrograd city Sovi-
ets. The Bolsheviks gained control of the Petersburg Soviet only when the alli-
ance between the srs and Mensheviks collapsed. Zenzinov and Gots were the 
party’s figureheads in the Soviet. The sr bloc in the Petrograd Soviet was huge, 
and was responsible for the Soviet’s key decisions—at over 1000 delegates, 
they were numerous enough to hold sway even when the sr/Menshevik bloc 
collapsed. The Soviet’s key decisions were shaped not through force of num-
bers, but through personal and informal associations in the presidium of the 
Soviet’s Executive Committee, nicknamed ‘the Star Chamber.’46 Mensheviks 
44 See for example Skobelev’s interview in Lyandres, The Fall of Tsarism, 199.
45 Delo naroda no. 4, March 18, 1917.
46 Rex A. Wade, The Russian Search for Peace, February–October 1917 (Stanford, 1969), 22; 
Sukhanov and Carmichael, The Russian Revolution, 359.
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dominated the Star Chamber—its members included the Mensheviks Niko-
lai Semenovich Chkheidze, Matvei Ivanovich Skobelev and Irakli Georgievich 
Tsereteli. Gots was the only sr involved. Zenzinov was a member of the Soviet 
Executive Committee, but, in practice, he did not participate much in the So-
viet, concentrating instead on his work with Delo naroda and with party orga-
nization. His political activities took place largely away from public forums.
In contrast to Zenzinov, Kerenskii was the archetypal frontman of the Pro-
visional Government period, and one of the best-known figures of 1917. He 
also became ‘the personification of the inadequacies and short-sightedness of 
the men of March 1917’.47 During the war, Zenzinov developed a close friend-
ship with Kerenskii which was to endure until Zenzinov’s death. The two men 
exchanged regular letters, and the tone of their correspondence is testament 
to the warmth and intimacy of their friendship.48 Kerenskii gave a long and 
moving oration at the commemoration of Zenzinov a year after his death.49 
In 1917, Zenzinov was one of Kerenskii’s key advisors and confidantes. Keren-
skii shared some aspects of Zenzinov’s background and milieu as a full-fledged 
member of the Russian intelligentsia. His personal experience, however, dif-
fered significantly from Zenzinov’s.
While Zenzinov and his close circle had spent the pre-revolutionary years 
in exile, in émigré life, and in the underground, Kerenskii was an influential 
participant in Russian public life. Kerenskii had his interest in radical politics 
awakened as a student at Petersburg University at the end of the nineteenth 
century. He qualified in law, and initially worked in a legal aid office for the 
underprivileged in a People’s House (Narodnyi Dom) organised by Countess 
Sofiia Vladimirovna Panina, before defending in a number of important revo-
lutionary cases, including the repression of Latvian socialists in 1906, and the 
massacre of Siberian miners at Lena in 1912. These very public cases enhanced 
his reputation as a front-line radical. He was elected to the fourth Duma in 1912, 
and aligned himself with the Trudovik group, a labour group associated with 
the psr. Kerenskii made a number of radical and doom-laden speeches attack-
ing the regime which frequently got him banned from the chamber, and his 
speeches were edited in the Duma records. It was in this period that he joined 
the freemasonry, which was to provide him with valuable cross-party contacts 
in the years to come. He was very active in the organisation of the psr, particu-
larly in the period 1915–16, as his police records show, though his relations with 
the party in 1917 were decidedly distant.
47 Robert P. Browder, “Kerenskii Revisited,” Harvard Slavic Studies 4 (1957): 421.
48 Zenzinov papers, box 1, letters between Kerenskii and Zenzinov, 1942–1946.
49 Zenzinov papers, box 43, clipping from Novoe russkoe slovo, October 21, 1954.
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Kerenskii’s signature policy was his absolute commitment to coalition gov-
ernment. No great theoriser or political philosopher, he strongly believed in 
coalition for the greater good, namely the successful prosecution of the war. 
From his earliest days as a Duma politician, he had been willing to cooperate 
with politicians from all sides of the political spectrum, on the condition that 
they were working for the greater good, that is, with progressive intentions.50 
His participation in autocratic government, even as a revolutionary voice, 
set him apart from the psr centre, and offered him a clearer rationale under 
which to function in 1917.
The first Petrograd city psr Conference, in which Zenzinov played a promi-
nent role, gave Kerenskii the party’s mandate to join the Provisional Govern-
ment. This was in a backdrop of wider unease and resistance to participation 
in the Provisional Government, both from the psr and the Petrograd Soviet.51 
The psr centre sought to gloss over the massive conflicts within the party over 
participation in the coalition.52 Zenzinov’s personal friendship with Kerenskii 
made him an important element in enabling Kerenskii to get involved in the 
Provisional Government with (limited) party support. Nikolai Nikolaevich 
Sukhanov described Zenzinov’s relationship with Kerenskii in typically caus-
tic terms, as ‘his mouthpiece, an energetic (backstage) assistant, and faithful 
squire.’53
Zenzinov’s support for Kerenskii became conditional by the summer. In an 
editorial on 30 July, Zenzinov demanded that Kerenskii needed to lead the Pro-
visional Government to be a revolutionary government, enacting revolution-
ary policy.54 This push to the left was defined by rising fears of a conspiracy 
from the right, in which Boris Savinkov was suspected. When these fears were 
realized in the Kornilov affair, Delo naroda strongly opposed to Lavr Georgiev-
ich Kornilov, and refused to brook any compromises.55 The Central Committee 
did not make radical demands of Kerenskii until 24 October, when they called 
for transfer of land to land committees, an armistice, and a more rapid convo-
cation of the Constituent Assembly, but they were ignored.56 The left of the 
50 See Richard Abraham, Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution (London, 1987), 61.
51 Skobelev’s account of Kerenskii’s intervention to win his support from the Soviet is very 
vivid (Lyandres, The fall of Tsarism, 184–86).
52 This is evident in Delo naroda editorials through the year.
53 Sukhanov and Carmichael, The Russian Revolution, 137.
54 ‘Strannye protivorechiia’, Delo naroda no. 14, July 30, 1917.
55 Delo naroda no. 140, August 29 1917; Delo naroda no. 151, September 10, 1917.
56 Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, 452.
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party was able to press these demands from much earlier in 1917, because of its 
distance from the coalition.
The party centre was alienated by Chernov’s attempts to enact land reform 
in his stint as Minister of Agriculture. Chernov’s involvement in the govern-
ment as Minister of Agriculture raised popular expectations, as Chernov had 
a strong national reputation as protector of peasants’ interests. As Minister for 
Agriculture, Chernov worked to turn the draft land law the psr had presented 
to the State Duma in 1907 into a workable proposal for the Constituent As-
sembly, which he anticipated would convene in September 1917. His attempts 
to prohibit all land transactions provided a legal fundament for the genuinely 
revolutionary abolition of land as privately owned property, and unsurpris-
ingly faced concerted resistance from the Kadet majority in the Provisional 
Government.57 This exposed a fundamental problem for psr participation in 
the coalition; where changes were proposed that called for fundamental alter-
ations of society, the more conservative elements resisted. Radkey presented 
Chernov as a lousy politician, who failed to take his ministerial responsibilities 
seriously:
Sometimes Tsereteli would nudge him and say, “Please listen Victor 
Mikhailovich; this is important,” to which Chernov would answer, “The 
editorial must be written, and, anyhow, I shall vote the way you do.”58
This anecdote should not obscure that Chernov’s inability to effect change 
from within the Provisional Government was a reflection of his political isola-
tion rather than his personal failings. Did the centre and right of the srs effec-
tively give up on social revolution in 1917, and become more natural bedfellows 
for the Kadets? Land socialisation was the central plank of their programme, 
yet in 1917 the centre of the party treated it as a distant ideal rather than an 
immediate prospect. Those on the right of the party seem to have accepted the 
coalition as an end and not just a means, and had concomitantly postponed 
the idea of a social revolution that would come about by the reapportioning of 
land. Many others within the psr remained committed to the principle of so-
cial revolution and the fulfilment of a radical land policy. The divisions within 
the party between left and centre congealed over the immediacy of reform—
the left embraced the need for immediate land reform, and this was one of the 
factors that pushed them away from allegiance to the Provisional Government.
57 Immonen, Mechty o novoi Rossii, chapter 13.
58 Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, 333–34. This anecdote is the product of an inter-
view Radkey had with Tsereteli in 1949.
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Zenzinov seems not to have been highly sensitized to the broader politi-
cal shift to the left that occurred in Russia by summer 1917.59 Despite the rise 
of the party’s left faction, he continued to berate them and to resort to party 
discipline, including threats of expulsion, in attempts to keep them in check. 
He was always a stickler for party discipline and unity, even in the face of a 
collapsing party. The left faction of the psr officially split from the psr at the 
end of October 1917, when those who supported Lenin’s new government were 
expelled from the party. The Central Committee of the Left srs was elected at 
the end of November 1917. The left had existed as a clear and distinct entity 
from the beginning of the revolution. There were two distinct psr groups from 
the outset within the Soviet Executive Committee. Zenzinov led the ‘intellec-
tual group’, and the worker and Left sr Piotr Aleksandrovich led a small worker 
group.60 The enrollment of large numbers of workers and the leadership of 
Kamkov ensured that the Petrograd psr moved hard left in the course of 1917.61
The crucial policy distinctions between the left faction and the party’s Cen-
tral Committee in 1917 were on war and power.62 By the summer of 1917, a Left 
sr programmatic position had crystallized that was distinct from the domi-
nant centre-right position. By the middle of 1917, the leftists were condemning 
the Provisional Government: pressed the party’s Central Committee to with-
draw support for Avksent’ev and Chernov, the two party representatives in gov-
ernment. The crisis of early July 1917 in Petrograd increased tensions between 
the Left srs and the party leadership. While the psr leadership regarded the 
popular demonstrations and unrest of early July as a Bolshevik-inspired event 
that required state suppression, the Left srs saw the July crisis as an elemental 
mass movement. After July the Left srs faced two clear alternatives—either 
to support their party leaders and risk becoming ‘traitors of the revolution’, or 
breaking with the party and holding true to their revolutionary ideals.63 They 
took the latter course.
Once in power, the left used the same discourses of the need for education 
and popular restraint and sacrifice that the moderates had used in coalition. 
This can be illustrated by the political activity of Andrei Lukich Kolegaev, also 
59 Delo naroda no. 135, August 24, 1917.
60 Piotr Aleksandrovich, whose real name was Viacheslav Aleksandrovich Dmitrievskii, was 
an internationalist during the war, and one of the Left sr’s leading figures. He was ex-
ecuted in July 1918 after he participated in the so-called ‘Left sr rising’. Kerensky mentions 
that he drafted leaflets in March calling on soldiers not to obey the Duma (Lyandres, The 
fall of Tsarism Revolution, 243, n. 33).
61 Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, 141.
62 See Ia. A. Leon’tev, “Persona’’nyi sostav Ts.K. partii levykh eserov,” 121–39.
63 Haefner, “Die Partei der Linken Sozialrevoliutionare,” 73–74.
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known as Aleksandr Kolegaev, in Kazan’. Kolegaev was the son of political ex-
iles. He had studied at university in Khar’kiv, but did not complete his studies. 
He spent a year in prison and was exiled to Archangel’sk, after which he lived 
in Paris until 1917.64 Kolegaev was a leading figure in the Left sr movement, 
and worked for much of in Kazan’, which was home to one of Russia’s strongest 
Left sr groups. He drafted the Kazan Soviet of Peasants’ deputies land decree 
in May 1917, which overruled the Provisional Government, and authorized the 
transfer of privately held land into the hands of the land committees.65 He was 
one of the most vociferous critics of the region’s provisions committees, which 
moved towards the use of force in grain requisitioning by July 1917, in the face 
of a recalcitrant rural population.66 A coalition of Left srs took over the re-
gional provisions administration in September. They were initially confident 
that they would be able to resolve the provisions crisis through reasoned dis-
cussion with producers. This proved not to be the case, and Kolegaev himself 
was forced to support punitive measures in the countryside.67
Results for the elections of the Constituent Assembly demonstrated that 
the psr’s popular support endured the fissures and compromises of 1917.68 
Multiplicity of opinion within regional party organizations enabled a broad 
swathe of voters to identify with the party. Did the psr support international-
ism, an end to the war, and radical land policies, or did it support the Provi-
sional Government unconditionally, along with continuation of the war and 
other increasingly unpopular policies? Voters could identify with the policies 
they preferred from the psr’s political programme. Support for the psr from a 
particular group within the population did not imply anything about their ap-
proval of central party policy, but only approval of the psr policy selected by 
them, as presented by their local activists.
 The psr and the First World War
Russia’s involvement in the First World War was the most important feature 
defining attitudes to governance. Those on the right and centre ground of the 
64 Protasov, Liudi Uchreditelínogo sobraniia, 314. Kolegaev was a major contributor to the 
Soviet decree on socialization of land.
65 Badcock, Politics and the people in revolutionary Russia, 203–06.
66 Ibid, 234.
67 Ibid, 230, 235.
68 See Oliver H. Radkey, Russia Goes to the Polls—the Election to the all Russian Constituent 
Assembly, 1917, ed. J. S. Berliner, S. Bialer, and Sheila Fitzpatrick (London and Ithaca, 1977); 
L. G. Protasov, Vserossiiskoe Uchreditel’noe sobranie. Istoriia rozhdeniia i gibeli (Moscow, 
1997).
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psr placed successful prosecution of the war, and thus defence of the revolu-
tion, as front and centre of their objectives. This emphasis on the war meant 
that the land question was subsumed by the need to maintain social order and 
provisions networks during wartime. The war certainly exposed divisions in 
the party like no other issue. Many of the far left favoured more extreme inter-
nationalism, that is, that the working people of all nations should unite, and 
reject the war effort outright. They saw the war in essentially class terms, as 
the wealthy capitalists of all nations abusing the toiling masses. This view was 
essentially irreconcilable with those of the centre and the right of the party, 
where views ranged from patriotic defencism to moderate international defen-
cism, which accepted the involvement of the class issue, but maintained the 
need to defend Russian soil. 1917 saw a desperate struggle on the part of the 
party apparatus to keep these conflicts under wraps, and to prevent an open 
party split. The struggle within the leadership on this question was mainly be-
tween internationalism and defencism, positions that were not actually that far 
apart. The prevailing opinion favoured a restoration of the International, the 
soviet peace formula, and defence of the homeland. The left of the party was 
ultimately driven towards the Bolsheviks by the war question—they proposed 
a standstill at the front, whereas the centre position, which Zenzinov held, was 
willing to support Kerenskii’s position of occasional offensives to retain mo-
rale. Despite this, however, Zenzinov’s writing confirms that he was a genuine 
defencist, and not a warmonger. He stressed the need to renounce secret trea-
ties, and subsequently embraced the Soviet formula of ‘peace without annexa-
tions or indemnities, on the basis of the self-determination of peoples’.69
The February Revolution caused a dramatic retrenching of Chernov’s posi-
tion on the war. He was the leader of the party’s internationalist wing from 
1914. He attended the First Conference of Inter-Allied Socialist Parties held in 
London in February 1915, and the First Zimmerwald conference, held in Zim-
merwald in September 1915. The platform adopted by Chernov at these events 
was that war was evil, and that it was founded on imperialist aims. At these 
events he stood alongside Mark Natanson, who was to become one of the 
Left sr leaders. After the February Revolution Chernov changed tack, argu-
ing that revolutionary defencism and a broad united front were necessary to 
protect the gains of the February revolution. Hannu Immonen argues that this 
shift in position was in fact consistent with his pre-revolutionary philosophy, 
which sought to unite a broad coalition of liberals and socialists against the 
autocracy.70
69 Delo naroda no. 9, March 25, 1917.
70 Immonen, Mechty o novoi Rossii, chapter 12.
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Chernov’s failure to vote against the death penalty, which was reintroduced 
by the Provisional Government on 12 July, is explicable in the context of his 
newfound determination to continue the war, but it was a final blow to party 
unity. Zenzinov avoided confrontation over this issue that so inflamed party 
divisions. Delo naroda did not even discuss the reintroduction of the death 
penalty issue, which had caused consternation amongst the Petrograd Sovi-
et and a broad swathe of srs. By failing to vote against it as party supporters 
might have expected, Chernov directly implicated the psr in the reintroduc-
tion of the death penalty.71 This pushed the Left srs closer to the Bolsheviks. 
The Left sr faction eschewed party discipline, and enabled the Bolsheviks to 
take control of the Petrograd Soviet on 9 September.
One of the psr’s most notorious public figures in 1917 was Boris Viktorovich 
Savinkov, whose political position in 1917 was determined by his strong com-
mitment to the war effort. Savinkov was an enigmatic and polarizing character, 
who to some extent defies classification in the elite networks of power.72 Sav-
inkov was born in 1879 to a noble family. He studied law at St Petersburg Uni-
versity in 1897, but was expelled in 1899. After various brushes with the secret 
police, in 1903 he escaped abroad where he was a key participant in the psr’s 
terrorist wing. He was co-opted onto the psr Central Committee in 1905, and 
took over the leadership of the party’s terrorist wing after Azef’s fall in 1908. Ze-
nzinov became acquainted with him in 1904 through the psr’s terrorist wing, in 
which both men were active. Savinkov made a strong impression on Zenzinov:
(Savinkov) impressed me as being very unlike most revolutionists. He was 
a distinct individualist, very aloof, carefully and even smartly dressed, a 
brilliant conversationalist and a poet. A few months before the attack 
on von Plehve Savinkov arrived in Petersburg with an English passport. 
His clean-shaven face and haughty air made him look exactly like an 
Englishman …73
As well as being a terrorist, Savinkov was a writer, a journalist, and a publi-
cist. He adopted a strong patriotic position at the outbreak of the war, and 
71 Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, 381–83.
72 Savinkov’s memoirs give a sense of his complex life. Boris V. Savinkov, Memoirs of a Ter-
rorist, ed. J. Shaplen (New York, 1931). See also R. B. Spence, “The Terrorist and the Master 
Spy: the Political Partnership of Boris Savinkov and Sidney Reilly, 1918–1924,” Revolution-
ary Russia vol. 4, no. 1 (1991): 111–31; S. W. Palmer, “A Crisis of Faith: Boris Savinkov and the 
Fighting Organisation (1903–1912),” Scottish Slavonic Review vol. 18 (1992): 35–53.
73 Zenzinov papers, box 13, p. 25, Zenzinov, Perezhitoe, 134.
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proposed that all revolutionary parties suspend hostilities with the Tsarist 
regime and the bourgeoisie for the duration of the war. His response to the 
February revolution was joyful, but emphasized that the revolution would en-
able the successful prosecution of the war. ‘Russia is free, and victory over the 
Germans is now certain’.74 This attitude towards February resonated with the 
positions taken by Zenzinov and especially Kerenskii, but personal animosi-
ties between Savinkov and the psr leadership meant that the Central Com-
mittee asked Zenzinov in summer 1917 to ensure that Savinkov not be given a 
ministerial post.75 Zenzinov himself had a difficult personal relationship with 
Savinkov. He admits that he had recommended Savinkov to Kerenskii in 1917, 
and, in a rare aside, said that he regretted having done so.76 Kerenskii ignored 
misgivings about Savinkov and selected him to serve in the Provisional Gov-
ernment. Savinkov was appointed the Provisional Government’s commissar in 
the eighth army, and on 28 June 1917 he was made commissar of the southwest-
ern front. He was made assistant minister of war on 19 July 1917, and was in-
strumental in the appointment of Lavr Kornilov as commander in chief. He be-
came thoroughly entangled in the Kornilov affair, and subsequently declared 
that he supported Kornilov’s aims, but not his methods. Savinkov was appoint-
ed military governor-general of St. Petersburg on 28 August in the immediate 
aftermath of Kornilov’s apparent attempt to seize power. He was expelled from 
the psr on 9 October because he refused to provide the Central Committee 
with clarification of his political position, in the face of his apparent complic-
ity in the Kornilov affair. Savinkov was a revolutionary maverick, and he defied 
the conventions of both his party and his personal associations to pursue his 
own political agenda in 1917. His case is a useful reminder that while personal 
networks and associations can go some way towards understanding political 
decisions in 1917, they can never provide definitive answers.
…
This article has sought to map the personal networks within the psr onto the 
structures of power in 1917. I argue that these personal relationships and net-
works can help us understand the ways in which political power, alliances, and 
relationships developed during the revolutionary year. This focus on Zenzinov 
offers us some insights into the psr leadership’s decision-making process in 
74 N. Erofeev, ‘Boris Viktorovich Savinkov’ in Politicheskii partii Rossii, konets 19- pervaia tret’ 
20 veka. Entsiklopediia, 544.
75 Delo naroda no. 164, September 26, 1917, ‘Otvet D. V. Filosofovu’.
76 Zenzinov papers, box 10, pp. 6–7.
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1917. Much of what Zenzinov represented was what the psr was subsequently 
criticized for. Despite his impassioned socialist rhetoric, he was not a ‘man of 
the people.’ He did not often mention in his writing working-class or peasant 
demands and desires. He was a classic distant revolutionary, who came from 
and stayed in his own milieu his whole life.77 The pre-revolutionary informal 
networks of power shaped the ways in which elite power was constructed and 
responded to challenges in 1917. The strength of these networks to some extent 
shaped and defined elite responses. Zenzinov’s clique failed to engage with or 
show respect for the party’s mass constituency of ordinary Russians, and they 
failed to engage with political realities. The factions contributed to a myopia 
that bedeviled the operation of revolutionary politics in 1917.
The outcomes of this study are in no way definitive. I cannot and do not 
argue that the nature of politics, or the radicalism of positions, was defined 
by these milieux and their apparent isolation from everyday Russian life. So-
cial background did not determine political positions in 1917, and the psr did 
not fail in 1917 because its membership was posh and remote from daily Rus-
sian life. The majority of the revolutionary leadership, Social Democrats and 
Socialist Revolutionaries of all shades, shared their experience of émigré life, 
cushioned exile, and a total isolation from everyday Russians and their lives. 
This seems to have had no impact on their political success (Lenin) or failure 
(Chernov). The shape of political power in 1917, however, was shaped by these 
intersections at least as much as, if not more than, the lines drawn in the sand 
by party political affiliation.
77 The disconnect of Russia’s elites from the concerns and agendas of ordinary people, and 
their reluctance to credit ordinary people with agency, is an ongoing theme in the litera-
ture on late Imperial Russia. See for example Yanni Kotsonis, Making Peasants Backward: 
Agricultural co-operatives and the agrarian question in Russia, 1861–1914 (New York, 1999).
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